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The various subregional groupings which emerged onto the European scene after 1989 have played useful, albeit low profile, roles in the interrelated processes of constructing the post-Cold War security order and enlarging the EU eastward. For certain subregional associations the 5th EU enlargement was therefore somewhat of a crossroads since they had been created specifically to assist their participants’ NATO and EU entry. Could or should such groupings continue to exist in the post-accession phase? If so, what should the purpose of cooperation be, what forms should it take and, most crucially, how would it serve requirements and challenges of actual rather than prospective EU membership? So far the actual EU enlargement of May 2004 has not as yet been followed by dissolution of any subregional associations raising the possibility that certain of them at least - even ones with the closest links to the EU pre-accession process - may be evolving into viable post-accession groupings. This paper discusses the transition from pre-accession to post-accession cooperation in the Visegrád Group (VG). VG, which consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, was one of the first subregional groupings to emerge in the post-Cold war environment. After some 13 years of cooperation, NATO membership for all four countries followed by their EU accession on 1 May 2004 meant that the (Czech VG Presidency Report 2004) “fulfilment of the intentions set out in the (February 1991) Visegrád Declaration put the participating countries before the question of how to go on”. 
The first part of the paper provides a theoretical/analytical context by identifying the alternative ways in which subregional cooperation experiences have interacted with EU integration. It locates VG within this framework and briefly compares its EU pre-accession role with that of other types of subregional cooperation initiatives that have been active in post-communist Central Europe. The next section briefly reviews the origins of the VG and the main phases in its development, covering the period from its formation to the May 2004 EU enlargement. This is followed by a description of the nature and scope of VG cooperation as it developed during the EU pre-accession period. The final part of the paper discusses the nature and role of post-accession VG cooperation, with particular focus on the issue of the VG’s potential as a vehicle for promoting its’ members’ interests in the EU. 

1.  EU ENLARGEMENT AND SUBREGIONAL COOPERATION PROCESSES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Alternative types of subregional cooperation
Four categories of interplay between subregional cooperation experiences and EU integration can be distinguished as follows:  pioneer; substitute; complement/pre-accession instrument and involuntary alternative/ substitute. Where groupings act as pioneers (Inotai, 1997) it means that they not only achieve a more advanced level of integration than other larger regional integration projects but also exert a major influence on the integration agenda of the latter.  The pioneer category is exemplified by the Benelux Group, which reached the higher stages of economic integration well before the larger entity it became subsumed in – the European Economic Community – and in so doing acted as an important precursor for the latter. The second type, that of substitute, occurs when states establish the subregional cooperation project as an alternative to other integration options with an integration agenda which could be either more or less far-reaching than that of other contemporary regional associations. In post-Cold War Europe examples of substitutes include the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and its ‘offspring’ the European Economic Area (EEA), though the cold war context of the former CMEA leaves EFTA and the EEA as bona fide alternative integration projects for those countries staying out of, or excluded from the EU. 
In the third category, the complement/pre-accession instrument, the participating states aspire to join a larger and more developed regional integration exercise and target a level of mutual integration up to limits that are both politically and practically defined.​[1]​ In the European context this kind of cooperation has been exemplified by the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the Baltic Free Trade Area (BFTA) meaning that this model is specific to the post-1990 period and to candidates from post-communist Europe. A significant feature of this type of cooperation is that it has been the least spontaneous and has in fact needed EU pressure in order to get off the ground. Initial reluctance to engage in subregional (re)integration seems to have been based on perceptions that it would impact negatively on ambitions for early EU membership. The fourth and final category, as yet hypothetical, is that of involuntary alternative/substitute. This scenario concerns those European states with the potential to become condemned to a ‘limbo’ of semi-permanent association with the EU. In Eastern Europe this applies most obviously to Ukraine and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) currently denied an EU membership perspective but earmarked for associate status under the terms of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU, and also certain South East European states covered by the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).​[2]​ In the case of the SAP states, since they do have an EU membership perspective and, like Turkey, lie within the limits prescribed by the ENP, the involuntary alternative/substitute would rest not on a deliberate policy on behalf of the EU members but on SAP countries’ failure to progress with the accession conditions.​[3]​ 

Where does the Visegrád Group fit?  
Looking at which of the above categories are most apt for VG, the pioneer, substitute and involuntary alternative/substitute models can be excluded with minimum discussion. The days of pioneer groups, at least outside of the EU, are over and VG is obviously not a substitute. Its official status as an entity to support and promote the process of EU accession rather than an alternative organisation has been consistently stressed throughout its lifespan. The fact that these days the VG, like other of its subregional contemporaries (for example the Central European Initiative (CEI) which has always combined EU members, candidates and non-candidates), is an organisation for states who are also EU members, is further evidence that it was never in any sense conceived of as a substitute body.  
VG clearly falls clearly into the category of complement/ pre-accession instrument though there have been key differences in the ways in which it has supported the EU membership endeavour compared with other subregional groupings.​[4]​ VG cooperation has three basic dimensions which are: first, intergovernmental cooperation at the highest levels which has been used, strategically and selectively, as a collective front in dealings with the EU and also to achieve the ‘catch-up’ needed by Slovakia after the delays in the latter’s Euro-Atlantic integration prospects caused by the Mečiar era; second to project an image of an ‘avant garde’ group of post-communist countries mainly as device to support the EU and NATO membership drives and justify earliest accession for the VG group; third, and particularly relevant in the most recent phase of the VG, concrete, including project-based, intra-VG cooperation in various spheres including culture, education, environment, tourism etc. (see section 3). CEFTA, the ‘close relative’ of VG, has on the other hand been exclusively focused on economic cooperation meaning that its pre-accession role has been clearly functional based on trade liberalisation to achieve mutual market integration in advance of the more intensive integration now under way in the setting of EU membership. In fact, VG probably bears closer connection to CEI than CEFTA. Top level political dialogue/cooperation (which includes annual summits of the CEI states’ Prime Ministers and regular Ministerial-level meetings) has been and continues to be a key dimension of CEI cooperation though the current emphasis of the CEI is to change the balance of the ‘switchboard’/talking shop functions and its concrete project-based dimension of activities more towards the latter.​[5]​  VG has, however, avoided the open membership and greater dilution of purpose often associated with the CEI. As a club of (until May 2004) of exclusively EU associates/candidates VG has been far less constrained than CEI in terms of its ability to focus and concentrate energies on EU pre-accession tasks.​[6]​  

2. THE VISEGRÁD GROUP PRIOR TO THE 5TH EU ENLARGEMENT

Origins And Evolution
The inaugural VG meeting took place in Bratislava in April 1990 when, at the instigation of Vaclav Havel, the Presidents of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland held informal discussions around the themes of  (Cottey, 1999, 70) “the ‘coordination of policies’ and ‘synchronisation of steps’ on the road to Europe”. Notwithstanding the vital importance of this initial move, various issues, including retention of office by communists which compromised the Hungarian and Polish delegations, held up substantive progress until the second half of 1990 when ministerial cooperation and further Presidential dialogue began to gather pace. Soviet actions in the Baltic states in January 1991 accelerated the process and V3 Presidents, Foreign Ministers and Parliamentarians met in Budapest on 15 February for the signing of the original Visegrád Declaration which stressed that (Vaduchova, 1993, 39) “(t)he similarity of the situation which arose in the course of the past decades compels the three states to work toward the achievement of identical goals”.   
In 1992 the present Czech President famously described the VG as an ‘artificial creation of the West’. However, it is in fact more accurate to view the emergence of the VG as more of an autonomous development instigated by the first post-communist leaderships of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland but necessitated and propelled by the realities and uncertainties of the external economic and political dimensions of the impending transformation. ​[7]​ The three ‘avant garde’ post-communist states found that a common agenda was thrust upon them which consisted of: disentangling themselves from the CMEA, Warsaw Pact and Soviet tutelage generally amid signs, especially in 1991, that the window for doing so may not be open for long; the corresponding need to establish new pan-European security structures or joining existing Western ones and also the pursuit of EU membership; dealing with the fact that even the new regimes in central and eastern Europe were not initially wholeheartedly embraced by the West. In this environment then, when it came to the external sphere of their affairs, the Visegrád 3 (V3) had, as Vaduchova (1993) put it simply “no alternative to cooperation”.  
The essential mission of the VG was focused on cooperation around the two key foreign policy goals – dissolution of the Soviet-era security and integration structures and accession to the EU and NATO. The V3 effectively pursued common policies around a range of issues connected to these two goals and by the end of 1992 the VG brand was well established within and outside the region. Yet 1992 was also the year of developments which brought about the onset of decline of the VG. A major part was played by the process of the division of Czechoslovakia and coming to power of two leaders who were both - for different reasons – counterproductive for VG cooperation. The advent of CEFTA, the growing tendency for competition to replace cooperation in EU relations and Slovakia’s progressive loss of ground in the EU and NATO enlargement process further undermined the VG. The invitations to begin EU and NATO membership negotiations received by the three in 1997 was for many the event which signalled the ‘clinical death’ of the VG. The period 1993-98 is usually characterised as, at best, a time of ‘weak’ VG cooperation with the internal strains compounded by the fact that even the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland came to lose their monopoly of  ‘avant garde’ status of post-communist states. Estonia and Slovenia, for example, also got their invitations to begin EU membership negotiations in 1997.   
VG cooperation took off again in 1998 in the context of governmental changes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the Czech republic an anti-VG leadership was replaced with a pro-VG one in a context where the evidence (especially in the realm of economic performance) for the Czech superiority complex that pervaded the Klaus government had evaporated. In Slovakia, a government with credentials acceptable to the West and the other VG members was elected. The renewal of VG was also connected to the NATO accession process of Poland, Hungary and Poland, which had been stimulating considerable cooperative activity between the three regardless of any official attitudes at the top political level. The VG revival was further underwritten by the fact that the move to the EU membership negotiation stage was also beginning to throw out some issues of common interest, which fuelled cooperation for pragmatic reasons. Though what was probably the major theme of the revived VG – assisting Slovakia to ‘catch-up’ in the NATO and EU accession process - was consistent with the new spirit of cooperation, this had a pragmatic dimension for the other VG members and especially the Czech Republic and Hungary for which separate Slovak entry to the EU posed considerable problems. For the Czech Republic, entering the EU before  Slovakia was bound to cause unwelcome disruptions to the high level of integration between the two. This not only included the customs union established upon division but more importantly the free mobility of people between the two territories. For Hungary the issue of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was relevant and accession of Slovakia to NATO was also in the Hungarian interest because (Fawn, 2001, 62) “its strategic position, left physically isolated from other NATO members, would be improved”.
By end 2002, of course, the aim of securing Slovakia’s catch-up, and with it the original objectives of the VG, were fulfilled (though not without occasional crises along the way – see below). During the period between the close of the EU accession negotiations and May 2004 debates about the future role of the VG – including, at least in some circles, discussions about whether it was actually going to be needed in the post enlargement era - were conducted at official, expert and even media levels. The aim was to conclude the period of reflection and agree a new framework document for cooperation by the end of the 2004 Czech Presidency of the VG.​[8]​ Before moving on to examine the results of this period of reflection and factors which will feed into the VG’s future it is necessary to give an overview of the character and scope of VG cooperation in the period up to the ‘turning point’ (if indeed it is so) of its members’ EU accession.

Nature and Scope of Visegrád Cooperation 
One important way in which the VG cooperation has differed from its two main Central European counterparts has been its apparent instability over the years, oscillating between relatively high visibility/resonance and virtual extinction. Ongoing uncertainty about the value and viability of the VG in part reflects divergent views of whether the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia genuinely share a common heritage and a sufficiently common future agenda now that the ‘return to Europe’ is a reality. For some VG is now a permanent feature of the new Europe, not always clear to pin down, based on an inescapable bond between the four countries and dense networks across them. Paradoxically, given its often precarious existence, the VG has also been seen by some as having most claim to a contemporary representation of ‘Central Europe’ (see Fawn, 2001) and indeed as a manifestation of Central European identity, a goal which has official backing according to the May 2004 Declaration of VG Prime Ministers which states that VG activities are (2004 VG Declaration, 1) “aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region”. For others the VG is an unstable and unreliable phenomenon, beset by internal contradictions that will come increasingly to the fore now that the common purpose of EU and NATO accession has been achieved, and insufficiently embedded either in compatible national interests or in elite or popular consciousness to guarantee that it will endure as an exclusive entity. The alternative perspectives on VG’s outlook are also a consequence of its own history of ups and downs since its emergence in 1990, which not only represent phases of relative activity and inactivity but also mark different stages in the content of VG cooperation. In this section the focus is on three distinct phases in the period up to the EU enlargement of May 2004 – 1990-1992, 1993-1998 and 1999-2004.

1990-1992
In the initial years the VG cooperation was almost exclusively focused on foreign policy issues and took the form of intergovernmental cooperation both between the governments of the V3 and between the V3 and the major external actors.  The success of subregional cooperation as an instrument to help expedite the key goals of external policy seems indisputable. As Rusnak (2001) notes the VG had a “spectacular start in 1991 (with) common success in dismantling the Soviet legacy in Central Europe (namely Warsaw Pact and COMECON)”. It is also commonly acknowledged that the collective approach to the EU played an important part in the EU’s decision to sign Europe Agreements with the V3 in December 1991, thereby granting them a ‘privileged’ status with the EU.  
VG cooperation also yielded important complementary security results as far as the relations of the V3 themselves were concerned. The successes in this respect included: eliminating early divisions within the V3 relating to alternative concepts of security frameworks for Europe based on the (predominantly Czechoslovak/Polish) idea for an inclusive pan-European solution based on the CSCE versus the preference for developing closer relations with NATO with a view to eventual membership; the general confidence and security-building process of intense diplomatic activity and ministerial dialogue and cooperation; cooperation on defence reforms to include (Cottey, 1999, 75) “a system of regular consultation at all levels of the military and examining possibilities for closer cooperation in military technology, production and procurement…(b)ilateral military cooperation agreements were also concluded between the three states in the spring of 1999”. Given the way that events were unfolding in the former Yugoslavia, the way that the V3 managed their own underlying tensions caused by minority and other issues carried particular resonance.
Two further outcomes of VG cooperation that were more broadly related to both Euro-Atlantic and post-communist transformation goals should be mentioned. Firstly it played an often underestimated but absolutely crucial role at this time by providing the context in which the V4 could activate their economic cooperation in the form of mutual trade liberalisation. Though Western pressure to push ahead with subregional integration was a key catalyst, without the VG framework it is unlikely that the Krakow Treaty which created CEFTA would have been signed in December 1992. CEFTA was to play not only an important role in the economic sphere but also (see below) in the political sphere as well, particularly in the dormant phase of VG cooperation. Secondly, VG cooperation served the important purpose of cementing the external perception of the V3 as a group. Cottey (1999, 74) observed that there was “little doubt that the Visegrád states’ concerted pressure forced the West to address their concerns more directly” and that the West soon came to treat (Cottey, 1999, 77) “the three countries as a group, with Central European Prime Ministers meeting as a group with EC leaders for the first time in October 1992”. Fawn (2001, 54) comments that “Visegrád appeared firmly to exist on an official level. Its activities were wide-ranging…and major international actors treated the three countries in common fashion. Central Europe now seemed to be defined by Visegrád cooperation”. Of course the external perception of V3 as a cohesive and defined group had a janus face being both important for achieving the early breakthroughs in foreign policy but then becoming a reason for active attempts to disown the VG and by the end of 1992 what was to become a familiar theme of VG cooperation being hostage to the internal politics of its member states came to the fore.  
Before moving to the 1993-1998 period one final point about this early stage of VG cooperation is that it was largely confined to the top-level political sphere involving central governments. Extension to the civic and regional levels did not really progress past the discussion stage. As well as the lack of priority given to them by the political leaders, these dimensions of cooperation failed to materialise (Vachudova, 1993, 39) “due to the lingering impact of communism, which engendered both isolationism and passivity and also the rekindling of nationalism, as well as an overwhelming emphasis on constructing ties with the West (and)…important bureaucratic and economic obstacles”.

1993-1998
As is well documented, formal political cooperation in the VG declined after the end of 1992 with the Czech government becoming most notably ‘VG-sceptic’. The deteriorating position of Slovakia in the Euro-Atlantic integration process also undermined the VG logic and purpose, and resulted in an ‘empty chair’ when the first moves for VG revitalisation came in the second half of 1998. The mixed message of Western actors’ stance on subregional cooperation, with encouragement and support along with a tendency to treat the VG as a group in some respects on the one hand, and stress on individual assessments for EU and NATO membership readiness on the other, must also have played a part. The January 1994 summit organised by the US in Prague to confirm its backing for the V4 in the context of the introduction of NATO’s Partnership for Peace was a key event in terms of sounding the death knell for the VG. While Hungary, Poland and Slovakia favoured a (Cottey 1999, 78) “coordinated approach to NATO, Czech Defence Minister Antonin Baudys refused to attend a meeting with his Visegrád counterparts to discuss such an approach (and) Czech Minister for Foreign Relations Josef Zieleniec stated that ‘we don’t believe in organising lobbies or pressure groups to knock on doors’”.  Yet the pronouncements that VG was ‘dead’ proved premature, as its reconvening and reactivation in 1999 was to show. While 1993 to 1998 was certainly a dormant time in comparison to the form and intensity of VG cooperation which prevailed in the 1990-1992 period, there is evidence to suggest that the inactivity was not quite as pronounced as might seem and, moreover, that VG cooperation was essentially in a phase of transformation. 
The first factor to mention is CEFTA, which quickly emerged as a successful case of subregional cooperation in the economic field and acted as a useful surrogate for the dormant Visegrád Group. From 1994 onwards the CEFTA machinery included annual summits of  Prime Ministers which acted as an important forum for top-level political dialogue between the leaders of all the VG countries and also enable steady forward progress in the CEFTA project which helped rebuild confidence in subregional cooperation. Until it expanded in 1996 the CEFTA Prime Ministerial meetings were Visegrád summits in all but name. CEFTA also provided a framework for various Ministerial-level meetings in respect of areas into which CEFTA business was expanding (Finance, Agriculture, Public Procurement etc.). A further important contribution of CEFTA is that it established the practice of holding meetings at Prime Minister level whereas in the first active phase of the VG it was a forum for the VG Presidents. When the VG did reconvene in 1999, regular meeting of Prime Ministers became embedded in the VG process. Finally, CEFTA played a key role in (Dangerfield, 2002, 106) “bringing about the reconvening of the Visegrád forum. The 1998 (Prague) session, when the Czech side suggested that CEFTA could ‘develop some political dimensions along the lines of the Visegrád Accord’ clearly paved the way for the first meeting of ‘Visegrád 2’ in May 1999”. 
Secondly, though there was a distinct absence – other than CEFTA and also within the framework of other subregional initiatives such as the CEI - of high-level cooperation involving all four VG partners in the 1993-1998 period, partial cooperation was still in evidence. Bilateral cooperation remained strong between Poland and Hungary, for example.​[9]​ At both the 1995 and 1996 CEFTA summits, for example, the two used the occasions to argue (unsuccessfully) for the resuscitation of the VG (see Dangerfield, 2000). Also, even by middle of 1995 there was evidence that external imperatives to cooperate were beginning erode tendencies for individual approaches to Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. Pressures connected to NATO accession in particular stimulated a ‘de facto’ revival of VG cooperation albeit ultimately trilateral due to Slovakia’s exclusion from the process. In May 1995 the VG defence ministers met in Budapest to discuss integration into NATO. This was (Prague Post, 7 June 1995) “the first such meeting attended by a Czech minister of defence”. Intense diplomatic activity – including Ministerial, Prime Minister and Presidential meetings - in early March 1996, in the context of Warren Christopher’s upcoming visit to Prague was interpreted a heralding a major revival in Czech-Polish cooperation. According to Pehe (1997) a key reason why Czech foreign policy changed after 1995 was because “Czech leaders also began to realise that an individual race against Poland, in particular, for NATO membership was counterproductive. Poland, with its size and strategic importance, was clearly a favourite for early NATO membership. Close relations with Poland could thus only benefit Czech aspirations”. This trilateral cooperation accelerated as the NATO accession process progressed. Immediately after  the formal membership invitation was issued on 8 July 1997 the Presidents of the three stood together to (Rhodes, 1999, 59) “read a prepared statement of satisfaction to reporters (and)…five trilateral meetings of the countries Prime, Foreign or Defence Ministers followed by the end of the year”. 

1998-2004
As noted above, the first move to officially reconvene the VG was made during the occasion of the September 1998 CEFTA summit in Prague. A request that Slovakia take up its empty chair was the key result of the first meeting of the reconvened VG three in Budapest on 21 October 1998. The revived VG held its inaugural meeting in Bratislava on 14 May 1999 and produced a framework for significant expansion of the scale and scope of cooperation. The role of Visegrád 2 was based on the original VG agenda of furthering the EU and NATO membership endeavour, though with the catch-up mission of Slovakia too now an important part of this, but also with attempts to focus on various intra-VG cooperation activities to embrace broader (than just external) policy objectives and also to prioritise the civic/societal spheres. The first major feature of the post 1998 VG cooperation was the elaboration of the ‘substantive elements’ of cooperation as follows (Contents of Visegrád cooperation 1999): Foreign Affairs (maintaining VG image/profile; meetings/consultations/ transfer of experience in various fields but especially in the EU/NATO accession processes); Internal Affairs (border and immigration affairs; organised crime, drug/people/weapon trafficking etc.); Education, Culture, Society, Youth and Sport; Science, Technology; Environment; Infrastructure; Cross-border Cooperation.​[10]​ Subsequent protocols signed by the VG governments have added new areas of cooperation including for example joint actions in tourism development and promotion in 2002.​[11]​
A second key feature of the revived VG was the establishment of a quasi-institutionalised structure for the intergovernmental cooperation. This was necessary to serve and facilitate the expanded range of activities and ensure involvement of the relevant bodies. It was also needed, given the lessons of the 1993-1998 period, to ensure stability via a more permanent basis for VG cooperation and to try to make it less hostage to the vagaries of government changes in the member countries. The structure includes: two meetings per year of Prime Ministers; two meetings per year of Foreign Ministers; meetings of other Ministers as and when needed; regular meeting of ambassadors in VG Presidency country; meetings of VG Presidents; meetings of VG Parliamentary representatives; appointment of National VG Coordinators, meeting at least twice per year; intra-ministerial cooperation at expert/specialist level; establishment of the rotating Presidency of the VG which has an important role on coordinating both the external and internal dimensions of VG cooperation, including compiling the VG ‘work-plan’ for the year ahead – which sets a schedule for intra-ministerial meetings and expert consultations for example - and reporting on the progress of its implementation. 
A major innovation of this period was the establishment of the International Visegrád Fund (IVF), mooted at the May 1999 Bratislava summit and formally approved by the VG leaders in June 2000. The main idea behind the IVF was to complement the external dimension of VG cooperation with concrete activities in the internal sphere. The main activity of the IVF is to sponsor projects in the education, arts/culture and science and technology fields.​[12]​ The significance of the IVF includes the fact that it is a genuine VG permanent institution with its own premises, staff and own resources and legally commits the VG member countries to support the internal cooperation activities via the obligatory financial contributions.  Furthermore, the IVF has been perceived as an important tool for fostering and strengthening the incursion of VG cooperation into the civic domain. At the time of the of the public unveiling of the IVF in August 2000 Radio Prague reported that (Vaughan, 2000, 1) “Visegrad has never really captured the public imagination and that’s one of the reasons why the new fund has been set up…it aims to support regional cooperation at a grass-roots level, and give real meaning to the rather abstract idea of a regional identity”. The IVF’s outputs have earned positive comment within the VG countries. Polish scholar Bukalska (2003, 3), for example, remarked “how significant the IVF is for the region…Activities partially financed by the fund, though rarely making front-page news, are extremely important for increasing our knowledge about each other”. Former IVF Director Urban Rusnak stresses the IVF’s strengths in (Rusnak, 2001) “supporting building and maintaining ties between people of V4…(s)tipulation of cohesion among peoples is creating more positive public approach to the whole idea of Visegrád cooperation and making it more difficult to cut this process in case of less affirmative approach of political leadership in any of the member states”. The effectiveness and relevance of the IVF also seem to have been recognised at the top levels too if the willingness to expand the finances of it are anything to go by. In 2005 the IVF was given a budget of Euro 3 million which was already three times higher than the initial amount granted.​[13]​
A further important development was the ‘V4 plus’ formula which provides the framework for the VG to cooperate, as a group, with third parties which can either be individual states, regional entities or global organisations. The annual reports of the VG Presidencies include various occasions of  ‘V4 plus’ which can come at the initiative of any of the VG and can also be a response to requests from the other actors.  ‘V4 plus’ is obviously connected to debates about enlarging VG, which is ruled out at present, and also seems to have resulted in activities that sometimes produce little except dialogue/gesture (as was the  case with, for example, the meeting of foreign ministers of VG and Ukraine in July 2002 instigated by Poland)  and more concrete results at other times. A good example of the latter is the series of various VG meetings held with representatives of Benelux Group and the Nordic Council of Ministers which made particularly useful contributions to thinking about the post-accession role of the VG. 
As noted in the Bukalska (2003) reference above, much of the expanded range of VG cooperative activities are carried out quietly and have attracted little national media interest. Media attention to the VG does however, understandably surge when negative developments in top-level intra-VG political relations occur. Post-1998 VG cooperation has also had its periods of crisis with 2002 having been a particularly problematic year. Despite top agenda items including the EU proposals for farm and regional subsidies for candidates, the Czech Republic and Slovakia stayed away from the February 2002 VG summit in protest at (Financial Times, 23-24/2/2002) “remarks by Victor Urban, the Hungarian Prime Minister, suggesting that the Benes decrees were incompatible with EU membership”. While a change of government in Hungary helped heal this spat, further doubts about whether VG cooperation was working properly came when certain VG parties broke ranks at the December 2002 ‘endgame’ Copenhagen EU summit to either unilaterally accept EU bargaining terms on level of agricultural compensation payments (Slovakia) or  gain more advantageous last minute individual deals. The late Polish shift away from pushing for a raise in the 25% level of farm compensation payments offered to accepting instead lump sum payments into the national budgets and subsequent  negotiation of a Euro 1 billion transfer to its exchequer in the guise of what was called a ‘cash-flow facility’ disappointed its VG partners and particularly Hungarian Premier Medgyessy who saw this as serious evidence of the lack of any genuine alliance of VG countries. 







4. THE VISEGRÁD GROUP IN THE EXPANDED EUROPEAN UNION: COOPERATION OR COORDINATION?

Despite the difficulties that affected the VG in 2002 and 2003 and the discourses these events generated, it turned out that the official stance of the member state governments was that VG continued to be a going concern. The Declaration of the VG Prime Ministers’ meeting held in the Czech Republic on 12 May 2004 confirmed the ongoing existence of the VG and specified the main areas of cooperation. The Declaration states that (2004 VG Declaration, 1) “(t)he cooperation of the Visegrád Group countries will continue to focus on regional activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region. In this context, their cooperation will be based on concrete projects and will maintain its flexible and open character”. Four dimensions of cooperation are specified: cooperation within the VG area itself; cooperation within the EU; cooperation with other partners (including individual countries and other subregional structures); cooperation within NATO and other international organisations.​[15]​ The Declaration also affirms the intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms, based on prime ministerial, ministerial, presidential and parliamentary spheres. 
Comparison of the pre-existing VG cooperation with the provisions of the May 2004 Declaration reveals that the latter was more of a political document affirming the ongoing viability and role of the VG and rather than heralding a substantive departure from what was already in place. Of course, the new guidelines serve the purpose of adapting the VG agenda to the updated context and the aim of ‘cooperation within the EU’ is to some extent a move into uncharted territory. A key question would seem to be whether the environment of the enlarged EU (with a more disparate membership and an assumed set of shared interests for new members which are both inexperienced in operating within the EU and which also share certain economic characteristics) will combine with the cooperative tendencies already established and enable a distinct subregional entity within the EU to emerge. Or will the new environment mainly serve to bring the centrifugal forces to the fore and leave VG to remain at best a vehicle for furthering internal cooperation in the future with the possibility that the downgrading of the external agenda will gradually cause the VG to lose profile and relevance?
Some pessimistic assessments of the future of VG regard the external dimension of cooperation as crucial for its sustainability and vitality but see little chance for successful VG external cooperation without the common agenda of Euro-Atlantic integration to give it purpose and hold it together. In an early prognosis for post-enlargement VG prospects  Vachudova (2001, 12) argued that the VG would become a casualty of the separation of Central Europe into “two different groups of states… Provincial Central Europe and Cosmopolitan Central Europe will be divided by fundamental differences on matters of European integration, immigration and security”. Vachudova takes the view that divergent interests across the many spheres of the EU policy domain will prevail and the VG countries will (2001, 14) “find partners among the other EU member states that share their own interests, while their shared origins in East Central Europe will become more and more irrelevant”. Poland, will form part of Cosmopolitan Central Europe, eager to play an active part in shaping major EU policies central to its own interest and ambitions, including the CAP and CFSP and will also favour eastern borders being as open as possible taking a positive attitude towards cross-border movement of traders and workers. Willingness and enthusiasm to engage its military outside Europe and indulge a global perspective on security issues will also distinguish Cosmopolitan Central Europe.  Poland’s engagement in Iraq and taking of the lead in the EU’s mediation in the Ukrainian 2004 Presidential election crisis would be seen as evidence of these ‘Cosmopolitan’ tendencies. The other VG countries will on the other hand be characterised by a more defensive posture and approach to EU policies, lack of serious ambition in security policies and more inward-looking passive approaches to foreign policy in general. This together, with the higher profile of Eurosceptic, anti-immigration rightwing political parties will lead them into Provincial Central Europe which will (Vachudova, 2001, 14) “regroup the small post-Habsburg nation states of Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia”.
Imbalance caused by the presence of Poland as the factor which will undermine Visegrád cooperation in the post-enlargement environment is a common theme of the pessimistic scenarios for the VG. Well known Czech political analyst Jiri Pehe, in a more recent critique of the VG (Pehe, 2004) highlights Poland’s size, Baltic region/east European orientation, strong desire for a key role at regional and global levels, its part in the Iraq crisis and early showing as a uncompromising partner in European Council negotiations as factors which do not bode well for the VG.  Pehe suggests Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia should prioritise other cooperation initiatives, in particular the as yet underutilised ‘Regional Partnership’ initiative that combines the V4 with Austria and Slovenia. Pehe (2004) writes that “(s)uch a regional grouping, whose members would be connected by the virtue of a long common history and compatible interests, would be much more organic that the current Visegrád initiative – an organisation that lumps together three small states with a country that has more inhabitants than its three partners put together, plus its own power agenda.​[16]​ Another aspect of this theme is that in the enlarged EU Poland will - as a result of its size, key areas of interest in EU policies together with its regional and global security perspectives – gravitate to the larger EU states. Using the experiences of the VG countries in the ‘Future of Europe’ to give indirect indications of whether the VG could be expected to become a ‘compact entity’ in the EU, Kral (2003,2 ) envisaged that Poland “will belong to the ‘Big Six’ in the enlarged EU. It will be (or at least will try to be) on equal footing with the largest and influential EU countries like France or Germany which can be witnessed now (e.g. the so-called Weimar Triangle ooperation)”. Indeed Polish Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz’s address to the Sejm on Polish foreign policy in 2004 (MFA Poland, 2004, 2) states that priority will be given to relations with Germany and France and that the Wiemar Triangle  could enhance “understanding of mutual expectations and contributing to building mutual confidence”.  Vachudova and Pehe, together other pessimistic assessments of the future of Visegrád cooperation, are correct to identify some of the key risks and contradictions that the post-enlargement VG will face. Nevertheless, it is also possible to argue that the VG members should have an above average close relationship through which to pursue shared interests in the EU and will be able to maintain some kind of group identity within it.
First, as noted earlier the quasi-institutionalised structure of VG cooperation entails regular meetings at various levels of government. The scheduled meetings that take place as a regular  part of the VG process provide the opportunity to debate EU affairs and establish whether or not common positions exist which can then be pursued collectively. VG leaders have also  held extra meetings before key EU sessions, both separate from these sessions or on the fringes while the EU sessions are taking or about to take place. While this framework carries no guarantee of collective positions – or even that the VG countries will always use it - it does mean that an important mechanism to identify and activate group positions is available and has become incorporated into the policy making process to some degree. Evidence that this process of consultation was working was evident throughout the period running up to the May 2004 EU enlargement. Despite the ultimately insurmountable obstacles at the December 2002 and 2003 EU summits, the VG leaders and key ministers held many meetings in which they arrived at coordinated joint  positions, prepared joint statements in opposition to some key aspects of  EU bargaining positions in the negotiations etc.. Even after the apparent low point of the 2003 IGC negotiations the VG soon seemed to be bouncing back strongly when in March 2004 the  (Radio Prague, 3 March 2004)   “Visegrád  Four countries signed an agreement on coordinating their approach to applying for European Union structural and cohesion funds after they join the Union on May 1”
Second, the section of the Guidelines on the future areas of Visegrád cooperation which specifies the spheres of cooperation within the EU makes reference to a number of policies in which the VG countries expect to find common ground and in which various analysts within the VG countries have recognised too (e.g. Kral, 2003, Brusis, 2002, Bukalska, P, (2003). They include (VG Declaration 2004,3); an open section which provides for consultations and cooperation on current issues of common interest; active contribution to the development of the CFSP, including the ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ policy and the EU strategy towards the Western Balkans; consultations, cooperation and exchange of experience in Justice and Home Affairs, Schengen co-operation, including protection and management of the EU external borders; creating new possibilities and forms of cooperation within the European Economic Area; consultations on national preparations for joining EMU; active participation in the development of the ESDP, as a contribution to strengthening of relations and dialogue between the EU and NATO.  In addition to the official VG list, other aspects of the ‘regular business’ of the EU, for example on forthcoming budgetary size debates and resistance on issues such as moves to tackle alleged ‘tax-dumping’ etc. would seem to offer scope for cooperation, in both cases in tandem with other EU new members and the poorer states of the EU 15. Furthermore, several commentators have pointed to one clear shared strategic interest on the ESDP front: to try to ensure that development of EU military capability does not occur at the expense of the role and relevance of NATO which the VG states continue to regard as their prime security guarantee and framework. 
Third, some extra comments about the policies set out in Guidelines should be made. Several of them are pre-existing key EU policies which the new members are aiming to be incorporated into – Schengen, EMU in particular – and illustrate the key point that the day in which any new member joins the EU does not mark the end of the transition to full application of the acquis. Rather it signifies the commencements of the post-accession phase of the EU in which the new members not only adapt to working within the EU and look to progress to the innermost core of the integration they have joined. Additionally, the post-accession phase also involves the new members becoming players in an EU which is constantly evolving and it is increasingly evident that the external policies of the EU towards eastern and south Eastern Europe are obviously an area in which the new members can bring value added. Moreover, these are policy areas in which genuine consultation and joint activities and projects are ongoing, meaning that these are not prospective but current areas of cooperation in the EU. For example, on the Schengen area/protection and management of the EU external borders issue there were over ten VG meetings at either Minister, deputy Minister or expert level during the 2003/4 Czech Presidency as well as ongoing IVF projects and cooperative projects in the V4+ framework. As for the EU’s Eastern policy, the new political situation in Ukraine should enable more dialogue and concrete cooperation between the VG and Ukraine via the V4+ formula (see below). 
Fourth, even in the case of those policies where it some claim that the V4 will have dissimilar or opposite interests closer scrutiny of the situation indicates that this is not necessarily the case. The case of agriculture is a good example, usually highlighting the difference between Poland as a major beneficiary of maintaining high spending on CAP and VG countries such as the Czech republic and Slovakia which are assumed to want the EU regional aid budget prioritised. Yet when policy spheres such as ‘agriculture’ are disaggregated into the multitude of issues they actually comprise in reality, the idea of incompatible interests does not always hold true. In the case of agricultural policy issues three areas where the VG countries have been cooperating intensively (often in the V4 + format and with Slovenia in particular) are as follows: serious loss of export trade to Russia in food products experienced by VG producers since the May 2004 enlargement due to problems with the need for certificates of approval of sanitary standards to be issued by the Russian authorities (these certificates were not needed prior to EU membership); the debate over the need to harmonise the EU customs code, especially for food/agricultural products; reforms to the CAP sugar regime. To give another example, also on the agenda of cooperation is the need to ensure the interests of VG producers are represented in the agricultural market access deal to be struck with Croatia as part of the latter’s accession negotiations. The need to disaggregate policy areas and focus on alternative levels of policy is also relevant for CFSP. While the issue of an early membership perspective for Ukraine (and also future strategic concepts for EU relations with Russia, Belarus and Moldova) are linked to high politics/strategic considerations and less conducive to common VG positions, the VG countries can cooperate at the lower level practical dimensions of EU Eastern Policy. Contributions to the broader Europeanisation processes for Eastern neighbours, economic opening and other issues connected to business/economic and soft security concerns of all the VG countries and representing their chance to give real value-added to this EU policy sphere are all possible. As Gromadzki et al (2004, 16) wrote on the potential role of the VG vis-á-vis Ukraine: “the Visegrád countries, because of vested interests, could facilitate a more flexible implementation of the Schengen regime to the benefit of both parties…thanks to their unique perspective they have insightful ideas for supporting democracy and civil society in Ukraine…In addition to assistance provided by the EU, Visegrád countries should consider using their own resources to maintain and expand cooperation and encourage people-to-people contacts in their respective countries and Ukraine. This could take place bilaterally or through joint efforts, for instance through the International Visegrád Fund”. ​[17]​
Sixth, intergovernmental cooperation and micro-level cooperation via the IVF and other processes are not the only modes of VG cooperation at work.  VG cooperation can also be found working ‘invisibly’ in intra-VG networks at the non-governmental level, for example within pan-European sectoral associations/lobbies seeking to influence the relevant aspects of EU trade and agricultural policies. Representatives of the national VG country federations of   food and drink industries have been working intensively as a group (also in the V4 + formula with other new members) in pressing and negotiating with the European Commission in matters on concern to their members. This level of VG cooperation has been especially proactive and involved in the case of the agricultural and trade policy issues noted in the previous paragraph.​[18]​ Evidence that VG cooperation is working at business network level shows that to restrict the discussion of the relevance and operation of VG intergovernmental cooperation within the EU does not reveal the full picture. It also shows that it would not be straightforward and perhaps not even possible for government to terminate V4 cooperation in the highly unlikely event there was any political reason to do so. To illustrate the point about the role and nature of business/sectoral cooperation, even in such a difficult climate for cooperation as the SAP zone the avant garde role of business has circumvented political constraints. Croatian President Stipe Mesic once said that (Mesic, 2002): “we, the countries in Southeast Europe, are also trying to develop regional cooperation. The process is proceeding with somewhat greater difficulty because of the political past, that is, the war. However, businessmen have begun to remove obstacles and politics, I think, will have to follow them”.
Returning now to the intergovernmental dimension of cooperation in the EU, while there is room for collective VG approaches and mechanisms for exploring common ground exist, each VG member, as Bukalska (2003, 18) put it “has its own priorities and will, above all, look out for them in the EU…this does not exclude cooperation in areas where the Visegrád Group’s interests are concurrent, as was the common goal of integration into NATO. The V4 should be viewed in a realistic, not maximalist, manner. It should not set too high expectations and must be elastic in its adjustment to various situations”. The reasons to suppose that the VG will not become an automatic platform for coordinating positions and speaking with one voice on the EU stage seem fairly conclusive. 
First, there is no intention for this to happen and nowhere in official pronouncements on VG cooperation can one find such an aspiration. The watchword in VG is flexibility and the idea is that VG cooperation mechanisms are available to identify common interests and policy preferences and collectively pursue them but not to start from the premise that the VG exists to produce common positions, either in EU affairs or other areas. This state of affairs reflects the lessons of the final stages of the EU accession negotiations and differences over the contents of the European Constitution that played an important role in shaping decisions and expectations how the VG would operate in future. Since the events bred disillusion about the reliability of VG cooperation generally but also cast particular doubt on whether the VG countries would even constitute a coherent group in the enlarged EU they prompted a more thorough reflection and assessment of the state of the cooperation than might otherwise been the case. Subsequently this reflection process enabled the positive aspects of VG cooperation to be counterbalanced with the failure to fulfil what might have anyway been unrealistic demands upon it, and also prevented the VG from drifting into the post-accession phase without a firm and realistic agenda on the one hand and potentially damaging over-inflated expectations on the other.  As mentioned earlier, in the course of their own reflection on the post-enlargement future of the VG the member countries studied the experience of other subregional groupings in the EU and (VG declaration 2004, 7) “working contacts were established with the structures of the Nordic Council of Ministers and Benelux, from whom the Visegrád countries drew inspiration in questions concerning the functioning of regional cooperation within the European Union”.  The Nordic Council model, which successfully combines  countries with varied interests and approaches to the EU and which strongly focus on intra-regional cooperation was viewed as a particular interesting example for the VG.  
Second, it is well established that it is usual for a pattern of shifting alliances to prevail in the intergovernmental domain of EU governance and it will be normal on numerous occasions for the VG countries. To take one very recent example, on February 8 2005 EU member state officials met to discuss whether to (Financial Times, 16/2/05) “write into EU law a deal on train drivers conditions and hours signed in early 2004 between the Community of European Railways and Infrastructure Companies (CER) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF)…representatives of the Netherlands, Denmark, United Kingdom and Slovakia argued that the impact of proposed legislation on drivers hours had been insufficiently thought through”. It is normal for any states to have varying interests and circumstances, as well as instinctive attachments to sovereignty/independence which affect their approaches to and positions in international organisations and particularly in the EU where sovereignty issues are especially resonant. The VG countries may have strong networks, a cooperation culture and specific collective interests as new members which give the VG a measure of group identity in the EU but a healthy degree of divergence in many cases would be expected. 
Third, not only is it unrealistic and without logic to expect that the VG actors would concur on the myriad of issue arising in EU business but there is also the multi-level governance structure of the EU. MEPs, operating ostensibly independently from their home governments/parties,  tend not to organise in regional or even national clusters. In the current EP, for certain VG states the MEPs are predominantly from the oppositions to the national governments, most notably in the case of the Czech Republic though all sitting governments fared relatively poorly in the June 2004 EP elections. On the occasion of the EP vote on the EU Constitutional Treaty both the Czech and Polish representations were negative. Of 24 Czech MEPs just 7 voted in favour while a majority of Polish MEPs either abstained or voted no (Financial Times, 13/1/05). The EP vote shortly afterwards on whether Ukraine should be given a EU membership perspective was passed by 467 to 19, yet (Financial Times, 14/1/05) “in contrast with the European Parliament, the European Council representing EU members states and the European Commission, the EU executive, remain reluctant to accept that Ukraine could eventually join the EU”. Notwithstanding the non-binding nature of these EP votes (though of course the EP has very real powers to exercise in areas of EU business) and differences within the VG on how exactly and with what timescale the EU should proceed in enabling Ukraine to draw closer to it, these examples serve to illustrate the essential point that the issue of the VG acting together in the EU is complicated by the multi-level governance context 
Fourth, potential shortcomings of the VG intergovernmental cooperation procedures need to be acknowledged. There is the permanent risk that the individual V4 governmental leaders will opt not to use the V4 consultative framework. This is clearly most likely to occur in the context of any high-octane political conflicts or indiscretions which create serious tensions, as per the Czech and Slovak boycott of the scheduled February 2002 VG summit following the  Urban outbursts on the Benes Decrees. But this can occur in times of normal relations too as shown by the case of the (failed) Polish attempt at the December 2004 EU summit to (Financial Times, 19/12/04) “agree to give Ukraine special status”. Poland’s position was not supported by the other VG countries and though this may have been the case anyway, any chance of a common VG position was ruled out because the Polish government did not consult the other VG countries on its proposal prior to the summit. Go it alone instincts or preferences carry the risk of missed opportunity for positive application of the VG framework and can generate bad publicity in media and official circles and also send negative signals to the others about how certain parties perceive the group concept.  Because of the underlying frailties of even the post-1999 bolstered framework for intergovernmental cooperation, there have been calls for the creation of a VG Secretariat with the ability to independently formulate (though of course not impose) possible VG policy positions and partially free at least this stage of the policy process from the influence of personalities. The hypothetical VG Secretariat could also have an important role in the direction, coordination and promotion of the VG actions at the concrete, intra-regional cooperation level, especially as regards the activities of the IVF.  At present the opposition to creating such institutions for VG is firm and the creation of a VG Secretariat in the foreseeable future should not be expected.​[19]​ Resistance to institutionalisation of subregional cooperation initiatives in Central Europe has been constant throughout the post-1990 period. Despite many proposals which surfaced, particularly in the 1995-96 period, and mainly at the instigation of Poland and Slovakia,  CEFTA remained institution-free even though some proposals had a practical logic. Imbalance in the V4 – mainly to do with the relative size of Poland – has always been a key factor and it remains the case that suspicion that certain parties will, when it suits them, look to use the VG to gain influence in their specific matters of concern will be hard to eradicate.  

CONCLUSIONS
Though the EU enlargement was certainly a landmark for the VG, any debates about whether it meant that time could be called on Visegrád cooperation were premature. The fluid and evolving nature of Visegrád cooperation, though hinging always on the Europeanisation process, meant that unlike some other subregional groupings based purely on functional pre-accession activities – e.g.  CEFTA, which the VG members were compelled to leave upon EU accession – the VG was never going to reach a natural conclusion of its activities upon accession to the EU. The advent of actual membership of the EU coupled with high-profile failure of VG to achieve coordinated stances at crucial times in the negotiation endgame and in the 2003 IGC raised the need to debate and reflect on what the VG might and might not be able to achieve but not whether it could continue. Those lessons revealed that the VG would not be a platform for a consistent group position in the EU and acceptance that post-accession  cooperation in the EU, and indeed towards other international organisations would be essentially flexible.   
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Guidelines on the future areas of Visegrad co-operation

Having in mind the common interest of all participating countries presented in the Declaration in Kroměříž on 12 May 2004, future cooperation will be developed particularly in the following areas: 

Co-operation within the V4 area
	
-	Culture 
-	Education, youth exchange, science




-	Fight against terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration
-	Schengen co-operation
-	Disaster management
-	Exchange of views on possible co-operation in the field of labour and social policy
-	Exchange of experiences on foreign development assistance policy
-	Defence and arms industries


Co-operation within the EU
	
-	Consultations and co-operation on current issues of common interest, 
-	Active contribution to the development of the CFSP, including the “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” policy and the EU strategy towards Western Balkans,
-	Consultations, co-operation and exchange of experience in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, Schengen co-operation, including protection and management of the EU external borders,
-	Creating new possibilities and forms of economic co-operation within the European Economic Area,
-	Consultations on national preparations for joining the EMU,
-	Active participation in the development of the ESDP, as a contribution to the strengthening of relations between the EU and NATO and deepening of substantive dialogue between both organisations.


Co-operation with other partners
          
-          Co-operation with interested Central European countries, 
-	Co-operation with EU and NATO candidate and aspiring countries in support of reforms essential for their European and Euroatlantic perspective,
-	Collaboration in effective implementation of programmes of co-operation of these countries with the EU and NATO,
-	Co-operation with other regional structures. 
-	Collaboration with other interested countries and organisations.


Co-operation within NATO and other international organisations 
   				
-	Consultations and co-operation in the framework of NATO and on its defence capabilities,
-	Commitment to strengthening of transatlantic solidarity and cohesion,
-	Co-operation on the basis of the V4 experience to promote a common understanding of security among the countries aspiring to European and Euroatlantic institutions,
-	Enhanced co-operation within the international community in the fields of new security challenges, with a special emphasis on combating international terrorism,
-	Consultation and co-operation within the OSCE on issues of common concern for V4 countries; possible joint initiatives,
-	Consultation, co-operation and exchange of information in international organisations (UN, Council of Europe, OECD, etc.); consideration of possible joint initiatives,
-	Possible mutual support of candidacies in international organisations and bodies.


Mechanisms of co-operation  
			
- Governmental co-operation: 

	Rotating one-year presidency, each chairmanship prepares its own presidency programme ensuring, among others, continuity of a long-term V4 co-operation,
	One official Prime Ministers summit a year at the end of each presidency, 
	Occasional informal meetings of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers before international events,
	Deputy foreign ministers meetings preceding the PM official summits,
	Meetings of other ministers in V4 and V4+ format,
	Intensified communication of V4 national co-ordinators and their key role in internal and inter-state co-ordination,
	Consultation and co-operation of Permanent Representations to the EU and NATO in Brussels, as well as in all relevant fora (OSCE, UN, CoE, OECD, WTO, etc.).
	International Visegrad Fund and its structures.

- Meetings of Presidents of V4 countries




















^1	  It is important to note that though the complement/pre-accession instrument and the substitute types of regional cooperation can be distinguished in terms of intent there has been a commonality in terms of the form of economic integration developed and limits which apply. The usual pattern has been the formation of a free trade area, and though there is potential for intensification into a Single Market as the example of those countries which opted for the EEA shows, the essential point is that CEFTA, BFTA, EFTA and the EEA are all what Inotai (1997) calls follower groups. This means that the level of mutual integration is equivalent to, though does not exceed, what they already have in place with the EU and therefore integration with the EU has been the driver of the content of these regional integration exercises one way or another.
^2	  In the case of CIS countries, the development of an involuntary alternative/substitution subregional cooperation project presupposes the emergence of some genuine attempts at economic integration or other substantial forms of multilateral cooperation. Also, at the time of writing it appeared that the December 2004 electoral triumph of president Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine, together with the new dynamics on the EU eastern policy which the May 2004 enlargement has imparted, has already opened up the debate on Ukraine’s EU membership prospects despite the provisions of the ENP.  
^3	  Apart from the membership perspective already offered by the EU and the seemingly irreversible momentum built up by Croatia, the  ‘Wider Europe/New Neighbourhood ’ concept proposed by the European Commission in March 2003 and accepted by the June EU Thessaloniki summit, is instructive here in that the most obvious negative interpretation of this initiative is that a key purpose of it is to identify those European countries whose relations with the EU are going to fall short of full membership, even in the longer term. The Commission proposal (EC Commision, 2003a, 4) states that the ‘Wider Europe’ does not “therefore apply to the Union’s relations with the remaining candidate countries – Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria – or the Western Balkans”. EU member state referenda on Turkish accession, as on the agenda in France for example, means that Turkey’s status is not so clear cut of course.
^4	  See Dangerfield (2002) for a detailed analysis of the varied roles of subregional groupings in post-Cold War Europe.   
^5	  The CEI’s much looser links to the EU integration process have not featured direct pre-accession activity CEI’s role has been more one of contributing to the baseline ‘Europeanisation’ activities laying the foundations for integration proper, and CEI has also followed the principle that the benefits of the cooperation should mainly accrue to those states lagging behind in the overall twin processes of post-communist transformation and integration with the EU. A key mission of the CEI has been to help prevent new dividing lines emerging in Europe as a result of EU and NATO enlargement processes. 
^6	  For more on the impact of the 5Th EU enlargement on CEI and CEFTA, see M.Dangerfield (2005), ‘Subregional Cooperation And European Integration: Impact Of The 5th EU Enlargement’, Paper presented  at the 6th  Enterprise in Transition Conference, Bol, Croatia, 26-28 May 2005.
^7	  Not forgetting the important role of dissident-intellectual networks during the late communist era which translated  into political cooperation in the post-1990 regimes in which many of these former dissidents held office.
^8	  The V4 each take turns to hold the rotating annual Presidency of the VG which runs from June to May. 
^9	  See Cottey (1999, 85) for details of ongoing bilateral cooperation during the VG’s inactive phase. 
^10	  For obvious reasons it is not possible to go into detailed description of the cooperative activities, meetings, sessions etc. but interested readers can easily access more detail by consulting any of the recent VG presiding countries annual reports via www. visegradgroup.org.
^11	  A budget of  Euro 240,000 exists for joint promotion of the Visegrad territory as a distinct tourist area. Marketing activities include joint presentations at overseas tourism fairs in the main target markets – currently the US, Japan, China, Brazil and India. 
^12	  Early projects included, for example:  ‘International Film Festival for Children and Youth’;  ‘Seminar of the Multiregional International Business program – Central and Eastern European Countries’;  ‘Improvement of Biomedical Engineering in V4 Countries’; ‘The Conference of Visegrad Youth’.  Scholarships to cover the cost of intra-VG student mobility were introduced in 2003. 
^13	  The annual budget was increased to Euro 3 million at the suggestion of the 2003/4 Czech VG Presidency. Each VG member contributes Euro 750,000 
^14	  Lack of VG consensus was also evident on the question of whether the Constitution preamble should include reference to Christianity, again with Polish preferences not getting VG back-up, and also on the question of minority issues as per Hungarian views.   
^15	  See Appendix One for the full list of agreed dimensions of VG cooperation according to the May 2004 VG Declaration. 
^16	  The longstanding suspicion has been that Polish motives towards subregional cooperation initiatives in central Europe have mainly been less to do with ideas about the intrinsic value of such cooperation and more about using subregional groupings as instruments to garner support for Polish positions in regional and international organisations and affairs and to use the groupings to ‘amplify’ Poland’s voice abroad.
^17	  The V4 have also been using their cooperation structures to formulate policy inputs to the intra-EU debates on Eastern policy and this has included not only regular consultations between foreign ministers and other foreign ministry officials but also major V4 seminars on this topic (for example most recently in Bratislava in November 2004) involving experts from the major foreign policy research institutes/think tanks. On the IVF, the internal sphere of VG cooperation should be consolidated by the Czech Presidency’s instigation of discussions and proposals to adapt and upgrade the IVF to the new conditions of EU membership which will make access to EU funds to support and extend the scale of IVF projects more possible and extend IVF projects more into cross-border cooperation between the V4 and East and South East European neighbours. For example modest contributions to development of relations with countries in the EU’s new border zone are being made by the fact that VG scholarships are now available to incoming students from Eastern and South East European countries including Belarus and Ukraine.  
^18	  I am grateful to Lladislav Cervenka, Vice-President of the Federation of the Food and Drink Industries of the Czech republic,  for advising me of this.
^19	  Though some VG members – Hungary most notably in the post-1999 period – have been ardently more anti-institutionalist than others, the author conducted interviews with several of the National VG coordinators  in the course of this research and this was the basic message coming from of all of them. 
